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Reflections on the International Trade
Organization
WILLIAM DIEBOLD*

This article will attempt to give informal and sketchy answers to
the three following questions:
1. What made the International Trade Organization ("ITO")
different from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"),
or anything else, before or since?
2. Is there anything new to say about why it failed?
3. Where might we be in international trade policy if we had
the ITO?

I.

THE QUIDDITY

Before we single out the differences between the ITO and GATT,
we should recall what they had in common.
Both came out of the process carried on during and right after
the Second World War of constructing a multilateral, liberal, open,
world economy. As others have already said, it was common at the
time to speak of the ITO as "the third leg of the Bretton Woods
stool." We thought we could demonstrate that the whole financial
and monetary mechanism already agreed to at Bretton Woods wouldn't
work if we did not have an arrangement for trade of the sort that
would have been provided by the ITO and the Havana Charter of
1947-or something very like it. Obviously, we were wrong.
GATT and the ITO were alike in reflecting the view of those
who had studied the interwar experience that international agreements
concerning trade should embody concrete, workable, commitments.
There should be no repetition of the League of Nations experience of
trade conferences that produced fine statements of principle that were
not adhered to.
At the same time, principles were important-very important.
Both GATT and the ITO embodied the same principles: multilateralism; reciprocity; equal treatment; provisions for negotiations to
reduce tariffs and other trade barriers; and the creation of intergovSenior Fellow Emeritus, Council on Foreign Relations. This article is a
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ernmental machinery to carry out the processes devised to move
toward those objectives.
Neither the ITO nor GATT said a word about free trade. The
reason was not just that in the United States, at least,-and I think
in much of the rest of the world-the term was politically untouchable,
or at least unsayable. The issue went deeper than that. I know of no
one involved in working out the problems of international trade at
the time who thought that free trade was a realistic goal or even a
reasonable aspiration for a liberal economic system that had to be
operated by sovereign states. Indeed, I know of no one, including
me, who expected as much tariff reduction as we got by the end of
the Kennedy Round.
Perhaps the best way of fitting together GATT and the ITO is
to think of the GATT agreement as the chapter of the ITO Charter
dealing with traditional trade restrictions, such as tariffs, quotas, and
some non-tariff barriers. The reason this "chapter" was adopted in
isolation, while the negotiations for the Charter were still going on,
was because those negotiations were turning out to be slower and
more difficult than had been expected. There was a feeling that the
processes for reducing trade barriers should be put in operation before
new structures of production increased the resistances to trade liberalization all over the world. I was told that Will Clayton said that
"we need to act before the vested interests get their vests on." Whether
he really said that, I don't know, but it makes the point.
Thought of as an advance installment, GATT could be folded
into the ITO later on. In that comprehensiveness lay the quiddity of
the Charter, the factor that made it different not only from GATT
but from efforts to liberalize trade before or since.
As I see it, the ITO was based on the conviction that you could
not maximize trade liberalization-or probably not even achieve the
objectives of GATT-by means of traditional trade negotiations
alone. It was necessary to do two more things. One was to deal with
segmenis of international trade not usually covered in trade negotiations and the other was to find some way of relating the rules of
international trade to the domestic policies of a group of diverse
countries.
To do these things it was necessary to break new ground in
international economic relations and also to permit international
agreements to influence domestic economic measures to an unprecedented degree. The resulting problems were bound to prove difficult
to solve, both intellectually and in practice. Not surprisingly, the
results were not altogether satisfactory and were more promising in
some fields than others.
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The efforts to go beyond traditional areas of agreement led to
what I regard as a fairly promising chapter about international
commodity agreements, a weak one on private business practices, and
what turned out to be disastrous provisions about economic development and private investment.
The effort to relate foreign trade policy to domestic economic
measures produced a chapter that was quite inadequate for its purpose, potentially quite troublesome, and yet inescapable. The real
defense for accepting this outcome was stated by Clair Wilcox, one
of the chief American negotiators, a good economist, and one of my
teachers, in what is still the best book on the ITO: "There is no hope
that a multilateral trading system can be maintained in the face of
widespread and protracted unemployment. Where the objectives of
domestic stability and international freedom come into conflict, the
former will be given priority." 1 .
He was, of course, reciting one of the lessons of the Great
Depression and reflecting a concern that touched all of the international negotiations at that time. The fear of a postwar depression was
quite general and, so far as the long run was concerned, the rest of
the world worried about being exposed to the impact of what was
thought to be the exceptionally unstable American economy. While
many of us thought we knew how to avoid depressions, or at least
cope with them, most of what we had learned focused on national
measures and no one had any really convincing international prescriptions-although there were many proposals.
There is no time to discuss the strengths and weaknesses of each
chapter of the ITO Charter. Most of the weaknesses stemmed, in
proportions that varied from case to case, from the inability or
unwillingness of enough governments to agree on new measures;
uncertainty about the effectiveness of unprecedented arrangements;
and the inability to work out better formulas. No one was more aware
of these weaknesses than the officials of the United States government
who largely led the efforts to break new ground. Almost every day
they had to try to figure out how to satisfy three sets of conflicting
criteria. To start with, there were the views of whichever key foreign
governments were essential for a given measure (and most of these
governments were less interested in trade liberalization than the United
States). Second, there were the criteria of Congress where international
measures took second place after domestic considerations and the
reduction of tariffs was still a highly controversial matter. Finally,
1.

CLAIR WILCOX,

A

CHARTER FOR WORLD TRADE

131 (1949).
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the officials had to cope with their own individual and professional
intellectual judgments and integrity.
Those of us who were hopeful about this whole process of
creating a new system of international trade cooperation thought that
setting it in motion would help bring about the development of new
practices and standards that would overcome some of the weaknesses
in GATT and the ITO and probably pave the way for further
agreements. We expected this process to center in the ITO which
naturally had more elaborate structures and procedures than the
supposedly temporary GATT. Perhaps the differences look more
significant now than they really were, but that is a matter to which I
shall return later.
II. THE FAILURE
As some of you know, it is over forty years since I published a
paper called "The End of the ITO." ' 2 In the intervening decades, I
have encouraged other scholars to take a critical look at that paper
and test its interpretations. They have archives to look into, I did
not. I was four or five years out of the government and had no inside
information though I had always been in touch with the people most
involved with trade policy. I don't think there were any great secrets.
Still, there are matters on which it would be nice to know specifics.
When the Charter was withdrawn from Congress in December 1950,
did anyone in the executive branch argue against that course? When
the votes in Congress were counted what was assumed about the
pressures the executive branch could mobilize? Looking back to 1948
and 1949 when business organizations were taking positions on the
Charter and their opinions were divided, I would like to know who
had said what and why did the victors carry the day? So far as I
know, few people have dug into these questions. If there are any
interesting results, I have not heard of them and would love to know
about them.
Absent better work by others, I have had to reread my own and
look at a few things I found in my files. However, I have not done
any new research. You will not be.surprised to hear that I have come
out of that process thinking that what I said at the time was about
right. To be sure, I would say some things a bit differently and amend
my statements on some points but I see no reason to change the
fundamentals. These can be put quite briefly; for support and qualifications, you will have to read the essay yourselves.
2. William Diebold, The End of the ITO, in 16

ESSAYS IN INT'L FINANCE

(International Finance Section, Princeton University, 1952).
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As I have explained, the effort to write the ITO Charter in a way
that dealt realistically and comprehensively with the problems of
making rules for world trade and also liberalizing it produced a
complicated document with novel provisions that were, inevitably, of
uncertain purport. Different parts of the Charter were attacked by
people holding quite different points of view. In the end, as I said in
my essay, the Charter was "whipsawed between protectionists and
perfectionists" in the United States. What happened in the United
States was decisive for the world.
The specifics behind these generalizations boil down to a few key
points. Changes in the world lowered the importance of the ITO
compared to such matters as the Marshall Plan, North Atlantic Treaty
Organization ("NATO"), and the Korean War. There were developments in domestic politics and economics that increased protectionist
pressures and weakened the ability of the executive branch to get
what it wanted from Congress. It had to concentrate on the more
urgent issues. The task of getting adequate support for the ITO
became more difficult when the most influential segments of business
opinion turned against it.
At the time, this last development seemed to me to be the crux
of the matter and it still does. I believe that the other sets of problems
could have been overcome if there had been strong business support
for ITO, or maybe even the kind of moderate support that business,
taken as a whole, had usually given to the renewals of the Trade
Agreements Acts.
Much of the argument made by business groups against the ITO
was the usual mix: it doesn't do enough to get down foreign barriers;
the United States will stick to rules but others will not; there were
too many exceptions or escape clauses that applied to foreign countries
but not the United States; and directly, or by implication, the Charter
sanctioned too much government intervention in the economy. There
was something to be said for many of these contentions. Certainly
the Charter was full of weaknesses and imperfections but, said
supporters of the Charter, that was bound to be so as long as so
many countries were in great economic difficulty and the future was
so uncertain. As recovery advanced and balances of payments improved, there would be less use of escape clauses and exceptions.
When confidence in the future grew, the Charter could be strengthened. Meanwhile, there were safeguards for the United States against
the abuse of escape clauses. In looking at other measures, business
people had swallowed comparable objections and one might have
thought they would accept the government's argument that the Charter
was the most that could be extracted from other countries at the time.
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Major business groups, however, refused to go along with these
arguments and said the United States should reject the Charter it had
done so much to shape. In my view, the breaking point was the
investment chapter. As many businessmen saw it, the provisions on
development and investment not only offered no gain but also sanctioned behavior by foreign governments that the United States had
long tried to change. The irony of the situation was that most of the
offending features would not have appeared in the Charter if business
groups had not pushed so hard for expanding the brief references to
investment in earlier drafts.
One could foresee at the time that the results would be poor.
The State Department argued that modernized versions of traditional
Treaties on Foreign Commerce and Navigation provided a better way'
of dealing with investment issues country by country. In the Charter
negotiations, it was almost a case of the United States against the rest
of the world. It was a late stage of the Charter negotiations and the
American bargaining position was weak; the United States had obtained much of what it wanted but had made almost all the concessions
that were acceptable. Nevertheless, the government followed the course
the businessmen wanted.
No one on the American side was satisfied with the outcome.
Those who advocated accepting the Charter, in spite of these and
other deficiencies, offered weaker defenses for the investment provisions than for anything else-as can be seen in Wilcox's book and a
pamphlet that Percy Bidwell and I wrote at the time.' Some businessmen took the same view. I heard some of the echoes of serious
arguments about what position various organizations should take. In
the end, most of them used very strong language when they came out
against the Charter; they leaned toward negative interpretations on a
range of issues and often condemned the Charter in rather sweeping
terms. I thought at the time that one important factor in this process
was that it looked as if the National Foreign Trade Council, one of
the traditional major supporters of the trade agreements program,
was no longer dominated by the concerns of merchants but by large
companies that saw direct foreign investment as the key to their future
international business. I would like to know more about that.
Indeed, I would like to have someone find out whether I was
right or wrong in what I said about the investment issue in 1952
3. Percy W. Bidwell & William Diebold, Jr., The United States and the
International Trade Organization, in 449 INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION at 208-12
(Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 1949).
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because I thought that it was probably the crucial factor leading to
the demise of the ITO. Until that happens, I can see only three major
points on which I would amend my old essay.
It was clear at the time that the ITO promised mainly
longrun gains; any shortrun gains in opening the American market
and liberating trade in the rest of the world to help European recovery
would have to come largely through GATT and the Marshall Plan.
Does that mean that GATT's early start weakened the case for the
ITO? I don't remember anyone saying that at the time but the point
seems worth some discussion. Has anyone argued it since?
As a second amendment, I would underline the fact that the ITO
no longer had any champions in the State Department, or elsewhere
in the government, who had much power and influence. Clayton had
gone, as had Wilcox. Nitze was doing other things. Acheson was back
but he never put a very high priority on trade matters except as part
of larger issues. I think he regarded trade liberalization as kind of a
hobby of Cordell Hull's and he did not have a lot of respect for Mr.
Hull's political judgment-at least on international matters. Raymond
Vernon has put forward the idea of "policy entrepreneurs" and I
wonder whether the absence of one may not have contributed to the
4
Truman administration's dropping of the ITO. Time was doing its
work.
Finally, I think the ITO's loss of priority needs more discussion
than I gave it in 1952. The main point seems obvious enough, and
yet could one not argue that the ITO would have helped promote the
objectives of the Marshall Plan and NATO? As a matter of fact, in
his foreword to the Wilcox book, Will Clayton said, "The program
that is embodied in the Charter provides a necessary sequel to the
program for European recovery on which the United States is now
embarked. The two are interdependent; neither can be wholly successful without the other. . ."I If that was right in 1949, it could
hardly have been wrong in 1950.
Nevertheless, there is not much doubt that an important factor
in the Truman administration's withdrawal of the ITO Charter from
Congress was that so many other, and often more urgent and sometimes highly controversial, matters had to be dealt with. Does that
mean the ITO was "a victim of the cold war?" I was startled when
I first heard that said because I had never seen the issue that way. I

4. RAYMOND VERNON & DEBORA SPAR, BEYOND GLOBALISM: REMAKING AMERICAN FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY, Ch. 1 passim (1989).
5. WILCOX, supra note 1, at x.
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am still worried by the ease with which that bit of shorthand can be
used and misunderstood.
It would, for example, be a misunderstanding to think that the
ITO was a victim of the cold war because the Soviet Union ("USSR")
did not join. That loss was unimportant as seemed clear at the time
and as has been borne out by the history of GATT. No great amount
of trade was involved and not too much could be expected of the
Charter's devices for linking centrally planned economies with market
systems. Had the USSR joined, the cold war would have fueled
Congressional, and other, resistance to full American support for the
ITO and perhaps blocked other trade measures as well. As it was, the
obstacles to the adoption of the ITO that proved impossible to
overcome were rooted in American relations with the rest of the
world, not the Communist countries.
It would be a considerable misunderstanding to suppose that even
though the ITO was the "victim of the cold war" in the limited sense
I have allowed for above, the end of the cold war means that the
ITO can be resurrected or even that it is needed more than it was
before. The need for new measures of international trade cooperation
and a strengthening of many of the past arrangements is real enough,
but that need was there before the cold war ended and was created
by quite different issues from those most directly related to the cold
war. How the end of the cold war might have increased the chances
for improving and widening cooperation on the major problems of
world trade is hard to see-except, perhaps, in the fact that more
people seem willing to think about finding ways to reorder international relationships more generally.
III.

MIGHT HAVE BEENS

Where would we be if we had the ITO? This third question has
to be dealt with even more informally than the first two. As a venture
in speculation, it is not worth a great deal of weight or time.
A few years ago-at one of the times people thought the Uruguay
Round was about to end-there was a surge of interest in the ITO as
a successor to GATT. People thought it would be stronger and more
capable of dealing with the new world. It seemed to me that to reach
that conclusion you had to answer two questions: Would the ITO
have worked? If it did, would it have been able to deal with the main
trade problems that were besetting GATT? Underlying both questions
was a third: Would governments yield to international rules and
decisions under the ITO more than they have to GATT?
I see no way to answer this third question without piling one
historical hypothesis on another. In thinking about the matter, it
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helps to keep two points in mind. The ITO, like GATT, was to be
an intergovernmental organization, not some supranational or autonomous body. The United States was as strong as any country in
resisting the idea of giving the ITO great powers. Have we changed
much?
To get an idea of whether the ITO would have worked better
than GATT, one could systematically compare the procedures under
both agreements and try to assess the degree to which international
constraints would have been put on national decisions. Probably the
"strength" of the ITO would look greater-but not as much as many
people imagine. I suspect that most of the time one would sense that
the real meaning of the verbal formula would depend on how both
governments and the international agency had dealt with changing
circumstances over time. Might dispute settlement procedures have
worked differently? Would there have been great differences in the
way international decisions were made? Nominally a one-country,
one-vote organization, GATT, in fact, could only do what a combination of key countries agreed on. Would that not also have been
true of the ITO? Could the ITO have gained the status of the Fund
and Bank if it had no money to dispense? Would international
supervision of the use of "temporary" safeguards have developed
strengths under the ITO that it did not in GATT? Would GATT's
influence have been much greater if the innovation of relatively quiet
country policy reviews had been introduced much earlier? The list of
questions can be expanded indefinitely. The answers lie not so much
in the text of the Charter as in whatever the result would have been
of forty years of experience with the ITO.
In imagining that experience, one would pay attention to the
differences in the substantive provisions of the two agreements. The
Charter paid more attention than the GATT ever did to the way
protection could be provided for infant industries. Suppose that had
become the focus for reconciling the principles of GATT with the
needs-or wishes-of the LDCs. Might better ideas have been built
up about constructive trade policies for developing countries than the
combination of virtually exempting them from most obligations while
giving them limited preferences but frequently treating them less
favorably than the industrial countries treated one another?
Commodity agreements and cartels have been a good deal less
important in postwar international trade than was expected when they
were given their own chapters in the Charter. Perhaps, though, it
would have been useful to have had established arrangements for
negotiating about OPEC when it became important. Even a weak
cartel chapter might have done more than GATT has done to lay the
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groundwork for analyzing questions about global oligopoly inherent
in joint ventures, patent swaps, or other kinds of industrial agreements
in fields where only a few firms really count. Also, there might have
been more progress in dealing with the problems of harmonizing
national anti-trust measures that Professor de Seife has written about. 6
It is even possible that developing standards for international agreements about agricultural commodities would have saved years of
frustration in dealing with agricultural trade by leading countries a
long time ago to the experiment they are now making in negotiating
about national farm policies and not just recalcitrant trade barriers.
You would have to draw a pretty long bow to persuade anyone
that the ITO's provisions on investment would have made a great
deal of difference to the postwar history of that issue. In the hopes
of making the best of the Charter's poor provisions, Bidwell and I
said at the time that "International investment deserves a code in its
own right." '7 Others have agreed; there have been proposals, drafts,
and negotiations. The results have been meager except as national
governments have come to want foreigners to invest on terms that
proved acceptable to the investors.
One can go on asking whether a very long list of trade problems
would have been dealt with differently under the ITO than has
happened in GATT. The Charter had the same omissions that are
now being partially filled in GATT, such as services, the environment,
and intellectual property. There are old questions like regionalism,
dumping, and national treatment. There are newer problems such as
rules of origin, the differences, if any, between high-tech and other
industries, the public financing of Research and Development, and
fluctuating exchange rates. Would the ITO have equaled GATT's
relative neglect of state trading, "voluntary" export restraints,and
defining the many varieties of subsidies? As the list grows, one can
see that the question can also be put in a short form: Would the
existence of the ITO have prevented the deterioration of the international trading system that has gone on since the early 1970s?8
One can spin out possibilities, with here and there a core of
plausibility, but for the most part there is no evidence. If one asks
6. Rodolphe J.A. De Seife, French and EEC Competition Law: GA TT and
NEB. L. REV. 488 (1992).
7. Bidwell & Diebold, supra note 3, at 212.
8. For an account of the deterioration and some suggestions for checking it,

U.S. Foreign Trade Policy Post-1992, 71
see

MIRIAM CAMPS & WILLIAM DIEBOLD, JR., THE NEW MULTILATERALISM: CAN THE

WORLD TRADING SYSTEM BE SAVED?

(1986).
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what relevance the broad question has to where we stand today, two
parts of an answer can be given, one positive and one negative.
Something like the approach that underlay the drafting of the ITO
Charter is needed today-the problems of international trade cannot
be adequately dealt with, and further major liberalization achieved,
except by agreements that deal with subjects going beyond the traditional scope of trade policy and that also relate international to
domestic policies. It is not, however, the ITO of 1947 that is wanted.

IV.

Two

FINAL WORDS

This is not the place to say what a new ITO-or a new anythingought to be. The discussion of the old one and how the world has
managed without dues, however, prompts two lines of further inquiry.
Do we live in the kind of world for which even a new model ITO
would be suited? The old ITO, GATT, and the other forward-looking
institutions and arrangements of the Bretton Woods world were based
on the idea that if the problems of the world economy were to be
dealt with better than in the past, people would have to accept a
higher degree of international interdependence than they had been
used to. It seems clear that today this is more true than ever but the
question is whether past concepts of interdependence are adequate to
the modern world. Bretton Woods thinking assumed that each country
should more or less manage its economy so long as it met common
standards in its relations with others. However, the developments of
the last fifty years such as the great growth of trade and investment,
the almost free movement of money, the internationalization of
business, and other related processes, have produced a world economy
that is not only highly interdependent but what one might better call
"interpenetrated." As the lines between national economies are
blurred-and the very concept of a national economy changes-new
methods and areas of international cooperation will have to be found
if the problems of the new circumstances are to be coped with in an
adequate manner. But it is also true that governments, responsible
primarily to their own people, will try to continue to have as much
autonomy as they can and will pursue it in the old-fashioned way. As
these contradictory forces' play against one another, it will take a
good bit of new thinking to work out new ways of dealing with the
issues of trade and the other elements of the world economy. One
may be sure that a modern prescription that has any real promise will
have to go well beyond the ambitious ITO Charter of 1947.
The second line of inquiry reflects on the reason the old ITO
failed. The special promise of the ITO lay in its comprehensiveness
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and novelties. Those will certainly have to be characteristics of any
new ITO approach if it is to succeed. But a new ITO, like the old
one, will have to be accepted by independent governments with diverse
economies and different interests. Therefore, it has to promise benefits
to all. Specific and concrete obligations will be called for along with
the acceptance of strong principles. It will also be necessary to permit
occasional departures from the rules, usually temporary and subject
to the consent of others. It was features such as these that made the
Charter seem "realistic" to some people. But the same features made
it unacceptable to others. Surely, something of that sort will be true
of any major, ambitious, new proposal. In the case of the ITO, the
differences proved fatal because of the key position of a group of
reputed "realists"-organized American business. Thus, the virtues
of the ITO were also its weakness. Is there any formula-incremental
change, a reduction of aims, partial measures known to be inadequate,
more selectivity in membership, shrewder management, better education, or greater fear-that may offer better prospects to new efforts?

